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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, < 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-18380 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
BEE, EISMAN & READY (HOWARD COHEN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the County of Nassau (County) to a 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) holding that the County violated 
§209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
discontinued a past practice of providing bottled spring water to certain employees 
represented by the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, 
AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
The ALJ found that the County had an established past practice of providing 
bottled water for CSEA unit employees in the County Attorney's office, the District 
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Attorney's office, the Department of General Services, the Comptroller's office, the 
County Clerk's office and the County Treasurer's office.1 That practice was 
discontinued by an August 9, 1996 memorandum from the County's Director of the 
Budget, announcing that, effective January 1997, the County would no longer process 
orders-for bottled spring waterunless it received a certification that the wateravailable 
in the County offices did not meet New York State Health Department standards. The 
County, satisfied that the water available from drinking fountains and restroom sinks 
was safe, has not purchased any bottled drinking water for employees since January 
1997. The decision to discontinue the bottled water service was not negotiated with 
CSEA. The ALJ determined that the provision by the County of free bottled spring 
water was a term and condition of employment as it affected the employees' comfort 
and was an economic benefit. 
The County excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the charge alleges a 
violation on a theory that the available tap water was unsafe and undrinkable, which 
CSEA failed to prove. Moreover, the County claims that the charge raises an issue 
covered by the "health and safety" clause of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement which is beyond our jurisdiction to entertain. That same contract provision 
is urged to be a waiver by CSEA of its right to negotiate the matter. The County argues 
1The ALJ found that there was no proof adduced at the hearing that bottled 
water had been provided to the Fire and Rescue Services Office and dismissed that 
aspect of the charge. CSEA's proposed amendment, made at the hearing, to include 
employees in the Senior Citizen Affairs office, the Drug and Alcohol office, the Human 
Rights Commission and the Health Department was denied by the ALJ as untimely. No 
exceptions have been taken to these aspects of the ALJ's decision. 
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lastly that the ALJ erred by accepting at the hearing what the County alleges to be an 
untimely amendment to the charge. CSEA supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The record establishes that the County has had a long-standing past practice of 
providing bottled spring water to employees in certain offices where the only water 
available was from drinking fountains or sinks in the restrooms.2 The County 
discontinued the practice on January 1, 1997, after receiving the results of tests done 
by the New York State Department of Health that the water in those offices was safe 
and drinkable.3 
The provision of free bottled spring water may be seen as an economic benefit to 
employees. The provision by the County of bottled water is much the same as employer 
provided free meals or coffee, as it eliminates the need for employees to pay for bottled 
water out of their own pockets.4 Further, the provision of water coolers in the offices is an 
added convenience for these employees and affects their comfort because they do not 
2There is evidence in the record that there may have been an actual or 
perceived problem with the safety of the tap water in some offices. The County, 
however, does not argue and offers no evidence that the bottled water service was 
started because the tap water was not safe to drink or as part of its efforts to correct 
that health problem. Accordingly, there is no basis to conclude that the bottled water 
service was a benefit conditioned upon the unavailability of safe tap water to drink. 
3After the close of CSEA's direct case, during which the parties had stipulated to 
the water quality'test results, the County rested. 
'
4See CityofNewburgh, 16 PERB 1J4516, aff'd, 16 PERB 1J3030 (1983) (free 
meals). 
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have to leave their office areas to get water at water fountains located in hallways or at 
sinks in restrooms, both areas open to the general public.5 Since the County has ceased 
providing the bottled water, many employees in the affected departments have brought 
their own water to work or have formed "water clubs" that pay for the supply and 
maintenance of the bottled water dispensers previously maintained by the County. 
In its exceptions, the County does not dispute the ALJ's finding that there was a 
long-standing practice by the County of providing bottled spring water to employees in 
certain County offices, nor does it argue that bottled spring water is not an economic 
benefit. The County argues that the subject of drinking water is covered by the parties' 
collective bargaining agreement, that CSEA failed to prove that the drinking water is 
unsafe and that CSEA attempted to amend its charge by "withdrawing" at the hearing 
allegations in the charge that the water available in the affected County offices was not 
healthy or was unsafe. 
The County argues that any complaints about the quality of the water are covered 
by the language of the "health and safety clause" in the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement, which provides, in relevant part: 
5See County of Nassau, 32 PERB 1J3005 (1999) (cafeteria service); State of 
New York (Dep't of Taxation and Finance), 30 PERB 1J3028 (1997) (office attire); New 
York City Transit Auth., 22 PERB 1J6601 (1989) (toilet facilities); City of Buffalo, 15 
PERB P027 (1982) (uniform fabric); Local 294, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 10 PERB 
fl3007 (1977) (seat style in police patrol cars); Scarsdale Police Benevolent Ass'n, Inc., 
8 PERB 1J3075 (1975) (air conditioning). 
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Sec. 17 HEALTH AND SAFETY. 
17.1 The County agrees to endeavor to provide safety standards 
for the protection of employees'well-being, commensurate within this 
context, to provide and maintain safe and healthful working conditions 
and to initiate and maintain operating practices that will safeguard 
employees. 
-The ALJ correctly found that CSEA's charge is about the County's decision to 
unilaterally stop the practice of providing bottled spring water to employees in certain 
County departments. Having determined that a practice existed, the ALJ analyzed the 
subject matter of the practice to determine whether it was a mandatory subject of 
negotiation. The ALJ determined that the provision of bottled spring water by an employer 
with no charge to the employees is an economic benefit, affecting employees' comfort and 
convenience and is a mandatory subject of bargaining which cannot be unilaterally 
changed by the employer. That determination may be assisted by the parties' theories 
about why the subject is or is not a mandatory subject of negotiation, but it is not limited by 
the parties' theories. CSEA's clarification of the charge did not constitute an amendment 
to it. CSEA's charge has always rested upon a claimed unilateral change in a mandatory 
subject of negotiation.6 The charge as filed alleged a change in practice and it identified 
the subject matter of that change. Whether or not the provision of bottled water is a term 
6CSEA's attorney clarified its charge at the hearing, stating: 
There is no claim that the water supplied to the employees is 
unhealthful. The claim is that the water is not drinkable 
because it is aesthetically unappealing, that being cloudy, 
and there are sometimes residues in it. But we do not claim 
these are unhealthy. It is also undrinkable because of its 
taste. 
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and condition of employment is a legal issue for our determination. "CSEA was neither 
required to plead a conclusion of fact nor to plead an ultimate conclusion of law. A charge 
need only give fair notice of the actions intended to be proved as violations of the Act and 
CSEA's charge was clearly sufficient under that standard."7 
Having found that the charge was based upon the unilateral withdrawal of a benefit, 
and not whether the tap water available to these employees is safe or healthy, the ALJ 
correctly found that the health and safety clause of the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement has no bearing on the charge and cannot be argued by the County as 
evidence that it has satisfied its duty to negotiate this term and condition of employment.8 
The cited contractual provision being immaterial, no jurisdictional waiver or duty 
satisfaction defenses can be grounded upon it. 
We, therefore, hold that the County violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it 
unilaterally discontinued its practice of providing bottled spring water to CSEA represented 
employees in the County Attorney's office, the District Attorney's office, the Department of 
General Services, the Comptroller's office, the County Clerk's office and the County 
Treasurer's office. 
Based upon the foregoing, the County's exceptions are denied and the decision of 
the ALJ is affirmed. 
7Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist, 28 PERB 1T3016 (1995); Civil Serv. Employees 
Ass'n (Dennis), 26 PERB 1f3059 (1993). 
8See Florida Union Free Sch. Dist, 31 PERB 1J3056 (1998); County of Nassau 
(Police Dep't), 31 PERB P064 (1998); County of Nassau, 31 PERB 1J3074 (1998). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County of Nassau: 
1. Restore the practice of providing free bottled spring water to 
the employees represented by CSEA in the County 
Attorney's office, the District Attorney's office, the 
Department of General Services, the Comptroller's office, 
the County Clerk's office and the County Treasurer's office. 
2. Make whole any employees in the unit represented by 
CSEA in the departments set forth above who, upon a 
showing of reasonable documentary evidence and/or 
affidavits, incurred expenses for bottled water from 
January 1, 1997 to the date upon which the provision of 
bottled spring water is reestablished by the County. 
3. Post the attached notice at all locations normally used to 
post notices of information to employees represented by 
CSEA in the departments set forth above. 
DATED: May 24, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
/
 Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the County of Nassau in the unit represented by the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) that the County will forthwith: 
1. Restore the practice of providing free bottled spring water to the employees represented 
by CSEA in the County Attorney's office, the District Attorney's office, the Department 
of General Services, the Comptroller's office, the County Clerk's office and the County 
Treasurer's office. 
_y 
2. Make whole any employees in the unit represented by CSEA in the departments set 
forth above who, upon a showing of reasonable documentary evidence and/or affidavits, 
incurred expenses for bottled water from January 1, 1997 to the date upon which the 
provision of bottled spring water is reestablished by the County. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
COUNTY OF NASSAU 
_./w's Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
by any other material. 
^ 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GREENBURGH NO. 11 FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS, 
Charging Party, 
- a n d - CASE NO. U-19710 
GREENBURGH NO. 11 UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent. 
In the Matter of 
) GREENBURGH NO. 11 UNION FREE 
SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19785 
GREENBURGH NO. 11 FEDERATION OF 
TEACHERS, 
Respondent. 
JEFFREY R. CASSIDY, for Greenburgh No. 11 Federation of Teachers 
RUBERTI, GIRVEN & FERLAZZO, P.C. (MARY HELEN MOSES of counsel), 
for Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School District 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the Greenburgh No. 11 
Federation of Teachers (Federation) to decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
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dismissing its charge (U-19710) that the Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School District 
(District) violated §209-a.1(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act) by communicating with unit employees about the Federation's proposals, 
statements and conduct, both during negotiations for a successor agreement and 
during the subsequent mediation sessions, and by refusing to agree to the Federation's 
demand that such information not.be communicated to unit employees. In U-19785, 
the District alleges that the Federation violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act when it 
conditioned its participation in mediation on the District's agreement to the Federation's 
demand that the District stop communicating with unit employees about the 
Federation's proposals, positions or conduct during negotiations. The ALJ dismissed 
) the Federation's charge against the District, but held that the Federation had violated 
the Act as alleged in U-19785. 
The ALJ found that the Federation and the District had been engaged for five 
years in collective negotiations for an agreement to succeed one which expired in 1993. 
After each bargaining session, the District sent to the employees in the unit represented 
by the Federation a written memorandum setting forth what had transpired during 
negotiations. The first six of the fourteen memoranda sent by the District were the 
subject of earlier improper practice charges filed by the Federation against the District.1 
In the ALJ's decision on those charges, the allegations related to those memoranda 
were dismissed upon the finding that the memoranda were an accurate description of 
1
 Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free Sch. Dist, 29 PERB ff4672 (1996), aff'd on 
J other grounds, 30 PERB fi3052 (1997) (subsequent history omitted) (hereafter 
Greenburgh). 
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events, which contained no threats or promises, and did not, therefore, violate the Act. 
The Federation filed no exceptions to that finding. 
In dismissing U-19710, the ALJ declined to consider the memoranda which were 
the subject of the earlier improper practice charges, holding that the memoranda were 
not relevant to the charges before him, that allegations as to them were^ untimely and 
that such consideration was barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The ALJ also 
declined to consider the seven memoranda issued between February 27, 1995 and 
June 9, 1997, because any allegations as to them were time-barred by §204.1 (a) of our 
Rules of Procedure and were not relevant. Considering only the District's January 6, 
1998 memorandum, the ALJ held that it was a permissible communication to unit 
employees. The ALJ also held that the District's refusal at mediation to agree to the 
Federation's confidentiality demand did not evidence bad faith negotiations and that its 
issuance of a memorandum after the last mediation session did not violate the Act, 
even if it had agreed at the first mediation session to refrain from communicating to unit 
employees during the mediation process. 
. As to the District's charge in U-19785 that the Federation had refused at the 
November 11 and December 15, 1997 mediation sessions to make any proposals 
unless and until the District agreed that it would not communicate with Federation 
members about what had transpired during mediation, the ALJ determined that the 
Federation had violated the Act by conditioning negotiations upon agreement to a 
ground rule, a nonmandatory subject of negotiation. 
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In its exceptions to the dismissal of U-19710, the Federation argues that the ALJ 
erred by refusing to accept into evidence all of the District's memoranda to unit 
employees and by not considering the Federation's allegation that the District had 
engaged in a "course of conduct" designed to undermine negotiations in violation of the 
Actv The-Federation also excepts to the ALJ's holding in U-19785 that it violated the 
Act by conditioning its participation in mediation upon the District's agreement to 
confidentiality. The Federation argues that the District waived its right to complain 
about the Federation's actions because it had agreed to confidentiality at the 
November 11,1997 mediation. The District supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
The ALJ excluded consideration of the six memoranda which had been the 
subject of the Federation's earlier improper practice charges against the District, 
holding that they were untimely and not relevant to the charges before him. The ALJ's 
timeliness and relevancy determinations are dealt with infra. The ALJ also found that 
the Federation was barred from offering evidence as to those six memoranda pursuant 
to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which precludes a party from relitigating in a 
subsequent action or proceeding an issue actually litigated and necessarily determined 
in a prior proceeding.2 To the extent that the prior improper practice charges also 
alleged that the District, in issuing the first six memoranda, had engaged in a 
"consistent and persistent" practice of communicating with unit employees with the 
2Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 62 N.Y.2d 494 (1984). 
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intent to bypass the Federation, the doctrine of collateral estoppel applies and the 
memoranda were properly excluded on that basis.3 
The seven memoranda issued from February 27, 1995 to June 9, 1997 were not 
accepted into evidence by the ALJ, in part because they were issued more than four 
months before the filing of the charge.4 The ALJ-'s- ruling is in error but that error is no 
basis to reverse his decision. 
In Greenburgh, supra, we specifically rejected the District's argument that 
actions taken or statements made more than four months before the event charged as 
a violation of the Act could not be considered.5 We there noted that the District's, 
argument was contrary to our decisional law.6 Actions which are taken more than four 
months prior to the filing of an improper practice charge can be relevant in establishing 
the elements of a timely improper practice charge even though those acts might be 
barred, as untimely, from consideration as independent violations of the Act:? 
3PERB decisions and court decisions have held that the doctrine is applicable in 
improper practice charges. See State of New York, 11 PERB 1J3084 (1978). See also 
County of Nassau v. PERB, 215 A.D.2d 381, 28 PERB 1J7011 (2d Dep't 1995). 
4See §204.1(a) of our Rules of Procedure, which requires that an improper 
practice charge be filed within four months of the acts alleged to be in violation of the 
Act. 
530 PERB 1J3052, at 3133 n. 7 (1997). 
6See, e.g., Town of Independence, 23 PERB fi3020 (1990), where we found that 
the impropriety of a 1987 personnel action was properly evidenced by 1985 events. 
7See Catskill Regional Off-Track Betting Corp., 26 PERB fl3024 (1993) 
(subsequent history omitted); Village of New Paltz, 25 PERB U.3032 (1992). 
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Notwithstanding the above, the parties agree that all of the memoranda are 
essentially the same in structure and tenor as the January 6, 1998 memorandum which 
was accepted into evidence. The Federation did not seek to introduce the memoranda 
for their content, only for their timing, each having been issued shortly after the 
bargaining session it describes. The Federation seeks-to establish by the number of 
memoranda issued and the timing of their distribution to unit employees that the 
District's intent was to bypass the negotiation process and to deal directly and in bad 
faith with the unit employees rather than the Federation. As the parties have stipulated 
that all of the memoranda are essentially, the same, and the timing of their issuance is 
not in dispute, the ALJ's failure to receive and consider separately the other 
memoranda was a harmless error and does not require reversal or a remand. 
Our review of the January 6, 1998 memorandum shows that it is a lawful 
communication which is not violative of §209-a.1 (d) of the Act. That it was preceded by 
sixteen other memoranda of similar kind over a five-year period, without any other 
evidence, does not support a finding that the District's issuance of this memorandum 
was improperly motivated.8 
The Federation also excepts to the ALJ's failure to decide whether the District 
violated the Act by engaging in a course of conduct for over five years which was 
designed to thwart negotiations and undermine the Federation's status as the 
representative of the bargaining unit. As noted above, the District's earlier memoranda 
have been found to be proper communications directed to the unit employees, 
aCity of Albany, 17 PERB 1J3068 (1984). 
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accurately setting forth the status of negotiations, without either threat of reprisal, 
promise of benefits or an attempt at direct dealing. The Federation makes no allegation 
that any of the memoranda issued by the District differed in any material respect from 
the memoranda held not to be improper in the earlier proceedings. The District's first 
six memoranda were held earlierto be permissible communications and its last 
memorandum is a permissible communication. The intervening memoranda, similar to 
those before and after held to be permissible, are likewise not violative of the Act. The 
District was simply continuing conduct which had previously been held not to violate the 
Act. Although that same conduct occurred through negotiations and mediation, a 
simple continuation of permissible behavior does not make that behavior unlawful 
under the Act. No course of conduct by the District in violation of the Act has been 
established by the Federation.9 That allegation is, therefore, dismissed. 
The District's conduct at the November 11 and December 15, 1997 mediation 
sessions and the District's issuance of a memorandum on January 6, 1998, informing 
the unit employees about what transpired at those two sessions, were considered by 
the ALJ. His factual findings are fully supported by the record, which establishes that 
the Federation insisted at the November 11 mediation session that the District agree to 
the confidentiality of those mediation proceedings. The District agreed to confidentiality 
on that date but, at a subsequently scheduled mediation session on December 15, the 
District stated that it would not agree with the Federation's demand that it not 
communicate with unit employees. The mediation then ended with the mediator's 
9See Town of Southampton, 2 PERB 1J3011 (1969). 
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suggestion that the parties proceed to fact-finding. The ALJ found that the parties' 
agreement that there would not be any communication with unit employees about the 
Federation's position, proposals and conduct at the mediation sessions was limited to 
the mediation process and that agreement ended when the parties moved to fact-
finding. 
We find that the District's actions at the mediation sessions, to the extent that 
they are covered by the charge, did not violate the Act. The Federation's demand that 
the District agree that it would not communicate with Federation members about what 
transpired at the mediation sessions was a preliminary issue to collective bargaining 
negotiations. As such, it is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation and the District's 
agreement or refusal to agree cannot constitute a violation of the Act.10 
Lastly, the Federation excepts to the ALJ's determination in U-19785 that it 
violated §209-a.2(b) of the Act by its unwillingness to make proposals during mediation 
unless and until the District agreed to its demand that the District not reveal the 
Federation's proposals and conduct to unit employees. The ALJ held that such 
demand, being in the nature of a ground rule, was a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation and insistence on it violated the Federation's duty to negotiate. The 
Federation asserts that the District, by first discussing and then agreeing on 
November 11, 1997, to refrain from communicating with unit employees during the 
^County of Saratoga and Saratoga County Sheriff, 17 PERB 1J3033, confd, 124 
Misc.2d 626, 17 PERB ^7010 (Sup. Ct. Saratoga County, 1982); Civil Service 
Employees Ass'n, Local 832, 15 PERB 1J3101 (1982); Town of Shelter Island, 12 PERB 
P112 (1979). 
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mediation process, and by failing to object to the Federation's confidentiality demand, 
waived its right to complain about the Federation's insistence on its demand at the 
December 15, 1997 mediation session. Based upon this alleged "waiver", the 
Federation argues that it was justified in its admitted refusal to subsequently engage in 
the mediation process* which was found by the ALJ to be improper. These arguments 
are without merit, The alleged improper conduct by the District cannot beused by the 
Federation as justification for its own refusal to negotiate.11 
As we have noted, insistence upon a demand which seeks to fix the manner in 
which the parties will negotiate violates the duty to negotiate in good faith because 
these matters are preliminary and subordinate to the substantive negotiations between 
V the parties.12 Demands that negotiations be open to the public, that transcripts of 
negotiations be taken or, as here, that no statements be made to the public during 
negotiations setting forth the positions of either party, deal with the confidentiality of 
negotiations and, therefore, are preliminary matters and nonmandatory.13 The 
Federation's admitted refusal to proceed with mediation unless the District agreed to its 
confidentiality demand establishes a refusal to negotiate in good faith in violation of the 
Act.14 
11
 Schenectady Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 21 PERB P022 (1988). 
12Sivpra, note 9. 
13C/V/V Service Employees Ass'h, Local 832, supra note 10, and Town of Shelter 
Island, supra note 10. 
) uSee City ofNewburgh, 15 PERB p i 16 (1982), confd, 97 A.D.2d 258, 
16 PERB 1J7030 (3d Dep't 1983), affd, 63 N.Y.2d 793, 17 PERB fi7017 (1984). 
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Based on the foregoing, the Federation's exceptions are denied and the decision 
of the ALJ is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Federation: 
1. Cease and desist from conditioning its participation in 
mediation upon the District's prior agreement that it 
will not communicate with employees in the unit 
represented by the Federation about the Federation's 
conduct, positions and proposals at mediation. 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
customarily used by the Federation to post notices of 
information to unit employees. 
DATED: May 24, 1999 
Albany, New York 
aael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
) PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
- NEW YORK STATE' 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free School District (District) who 
are represented by the Greenburgh No. 11 Federation of Teachers (Federation) that the Federation 
will not condition its participation in mediation upon the District's prior agreement that it will not 
communicate with employees in the unit represented by the Federation about the Federation's 
conduct, positions and proposals at mediation. 
..) 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title} 
GREENBURGH NO. 11 FEDERATION OF TEACHERS 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
h"any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-19843 
STATE OF NEW YORK (OFFICE OF ALCOHOLISM 
AND SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVICES), 
Respondent. 
KATHLEEN FITZMAURICE, for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (MICHAEL N. 
VOLFORTE of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Public Employees Federation, 
AFL-CIO (PEF) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing its 
charge against the State of New York (Office of Alcoholism and Substance Abuse 
Services) (OASAS) (State). PEF charges that the State violated §209-a.1(a) and (c) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it decided to earmark the 
position of Addiction Program Specialist (APS) III in retaliation for an out-of-title work 
grievance PEF had filed. After PEF had submitted its evidence at the hearing, the 
State moved to dismiss the charge as untimely filed. After briefs on that issue were 
received, the ALJ dismissed the charge. The ALJ held that the four-month period for 
filing charges under §204.1 (a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure began to run, at the latest, 
on November 7, 1997, when PEF's representative accused the State of earmarking the 
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APS III title because the grievance had been filed. As the charge was filed on April 1, 
1998, more than four months after the November 7, 1997 letter, the ALJ held it 
untimely. 
PEF argues in its exceptions that the time to file this charge should run from 
December 4, 1997, the date of a letter from OASAS Commissioner Jean Somers Miller, 
in which Miller acknowledged that the grievance was a "minor consideration" in the 
State's decision to apply to the Civil Service Commission for an earmarking of the 
position.1 PEF argues that it was not until then that it clearly had reason to believe that 
the State's decision to apply for an earmarking was improper because it was motivated 
by the filing of the out-of-title work grievance. 
The State argues that the ALJ's dismissal of the charge as untimely was correct 
and his decision should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. 
Unless an act is performed in secret, the time to challenge that act as improper 
runs from the date the act is done, not from the date the charging party first discovers 
evidence of improper motive.2 To run the filing period from the date of a charging 
party's discovery of evidence in support of the charge would permit charges to be filed 
1
 According to the ALJ, the effect of an earmarking would be the termination of 
the position as vacancies arose. 
2
 State of New York (GOER), 22 PERB ff3009 (1989); Board of Educ. of the City 
Sch. Dist. of the City of New York (Chamberlain), 15 PERB P050 (1982) (citing cases). 
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years after the act in question, a result contrary to the policies sought to be served by 
the imposition of a short filing period.3 
The act alleged to be improper in this case is the State's decision to apply to the 
Civil Service Commission to have the APS III position earmarked. That decision was 
actually known to PEF by at least November 7, 1997. Miller's letter of December 4, 
1997 is evidence of improper motive, not first notice of the decision being challenged 
under this charge. PEF's receipt of that letter did not mark the beginning of its filing 
period for a charge contesting the decision to apply for an earmarking nor did it serve to 
extend that filing period. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: May 24, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
~f jjohn T. Mitchell, Member 
; 3See County of Schoharie, 30 PERB P055 (1997) (rejecting undefined and 
open-ended filing periods). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In. the Matter of 
JOEL L. AMAKER, SR., 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20171 
TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION, LOCAL 100, 
Respondent, 
- and -
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
JOEL L. AMAKER, SR., pro se 
O'DONNELL, SCHWARTZ, GLANSTEIN & ROSEN (EDMOND PENDELTON 
of counsel), for Respondent 
MARTIN SCHNABEL, GENERAL COUNSEL (EVELYN JONAS of counsel), 
for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us oh exceptions filed by Joel L. Amaker, Sr., to a decision 
of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing an improper practice charge he filed 
against the Transport Workers Union, Local 100 (TWU). Amaker alleges that TWU 
breached its duty of fair representation in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Public 
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Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). Amaker's allegations concern disciplinary 
charges brought against him by his employer, the New York City Transit Authority 
(Authority)1 and arbitration proceedings held pursuant to those disciplinary charges. 
At the pre-hearing conference held on November 2, 1998, the improper practice 
charge was clarified to allege only that the TWU's representation of Amaker at the ' 
February 20 and March 20, 1998 hearings before the arbitration panel violated 
§209-a.2(c) of the Act. The ALJ assigned to hold the conference sent the parties a 
letter dated November 4, 1998 which confirms this clarification of the charge. Amaker 
did not object to the ALJ's characterization of the charge. Thereafter, TWU and the 
Authority both moved for dismissal of the charge as untimely because it was filed on 
July 24, 1998, more than four months2 after the alleged misrepresentation by TWU on 
February 20 and March 20, 1998. The case was then assigned to a hearing ALJ for a 
decision on the motion.3 The hearing ALJ dismissed the charge as untimely filed 
because, as clarified, the charge alleged only that TWU breached its duty of fair 
representation by misconduct at the February 20 and March 20, 1998 arbitration 
hearings. 
1Section 209-a.3 of the Act makes the Authority a statutory party to this 
proceeding. 
2Pursuant to §204.1 (a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure, a charge must be filed 
within four months of the act or acts alleged to be improper. 
3ln his exceptions, Amaker questions the assignment of the charge from the 
conference ALJ to a hearing ALJ for decision on the motions to dismiss. It has been 
our practice for several years, where possible, to assign one ALJ to conduct the 
conference in an improper practice charge and another to conduct any hearing required 
and to issue a decision dispositive of the charge. 
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Amaker argues in his exceptions that the ALJ erred because the charge was not 
about TWU's representation of him at the February 20 and March 20 arbitration 
hearings but was solely about his requests to the TWU on April 27, 1998 to reopen the 
arbitration proceedings or appeal the arbitration award. As that date was within four 
months of the date he filed the improper practice charge, Amaker alleges his charge 
was timely filed and should not have been dismissed. Neither the TWU nor the 
Authority has responded to the exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the arguments 
made, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
Amaker' s original charge, filed on July 24, 1998, dealt primarily with the 
disciplinary charges against him. He was notified by the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) that the charge was 
deficient. He filed an amendment on August 17, 1998, alleging that the conduct of the 
TWU at the February 20 and March 20, 1998 arbitration hearings was in violation of the 
Act. He also alleged that he had asked the TWU on April 27, 1998 to reopen the 
arbitration proceedings or appeal the arbitration decision, that representatives of the 
TWU told him they would get back to him, and that as of the date of his amendment to 
the charge, he had not received any further communication from the TWU. 
As Amaker's April 27, 1998 contact with the TWU representatives occurred 
within four months of the filing of the original charge and the amendment to the charge, 
a pre-hearing conference was scheduled. At the pre-hearing conference, however, 
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Amaker clarified his charge for the presiding ALJ. As clarified, the charge deals solely 
with TWU's conduct at the arbitration hearings. That clarification was confirmed in the 
ALJ's November 4, 1998 letter to the parties, which set a date for briefs on the TWU's 
and the Authority's motions to dismiss. Amaker responded to the ALJ's letter with his 
own letter of November 25, 1998, in which he stated that the charge was timely . . .. 
because he had received the decision of the arbitration panel on March 30, 1998. The 
charge was filed within four months of the date he allegedly received the arbitration 
award, but not within four months of the acts of alleged misrepresentation. He did not 
raise any objection to the ALJ's characterization of his charge or the recitation of the 
charge as clarified. The TWU and the Authority filed briefs with the ALJ in support of 
their motions, but Amaker did not. 
Amaker attempts in his exceptions to resurrect an allegation in his charge which 
was dropped at the pre-hearing conference when he clarified his charge. If he believed 
his charge truly centered on his allegation that the TWU had not responded to his 
April 27, 1998 request for reconsideration or appeal of the arbitration award,4 he had 
ample opportunity to so inform the ALJ in his response to the ALJ's November 4, 1998 
letter, in which the ALJ defined the issues and set a briefing schedule. Without 
contesting the accuracy of the ALJ's statement of the charge, Amaker argued only that 
the misrepresentation allegations were timely because the charge was filed within four 
4lndeed, in all of Amaker's correspondence with the Assistant Director and the 
ALJs assigned to this case, he focuses on the TWU's representation of him at the 
arbitration hearings. 
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months of his receipt of the arbitration award. He may not now use exceptions to place 
before us allegations not litigated, briefed or decided. 
Based on the foregoing, Amaker's exceptions are denied and the decision of the 
ALJ is affirmed.5 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby is, 
dismissed. 
DATED: May 24, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
MarcKTAbbott, Member 
oho T. Mitchell, Member 
5Given the basis for our disposition of the exceptions, we do not decide whether 
an improper practice charge alleging a breach of the duty of fair representation based 
upon union conduct during the processing of a grievance or disciplinary charge, which 
occurred more than four months prior to the filing of the charge, would be timeiy, under 
a continuous representation theory, if filed within four months of the charging party's 
receipt of the arbitration award disposing of the grievance or charge. See Orange 
County Correction Officers Benevolent Ass'n, 28 PERB 113081 (1995). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
PETER RUNFOLA, 
Charging Party, 
- and - CASE NO. U-20629 
LOCAL 2028, INTERNATIONAL 
LONGSHOREMAN'S ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent. 
MORRIS, CANTOR, BARNES, GOODMAN & FURLONG (RICHARD D. 
FURLONG), for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Peter Runfola to a decision by the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) dismissing an 
improper practice charge he filed against Local 2028, International Longshoreman's 
Association (Local). Runfola alleges that the Local breached its duty of fair 
representation (DFR) in violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when, on October 3, 1998, he was laid off by his employer, the 
Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (Authority), pursuant to a contractual 
provision negotiated by the Local in July 1998. Runfola alleges that the contract 
provision under which he lost his job was new, that it was a material change in the then 
existing contractual language, and that the recently elected officers of the Local 
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negotiated the clause to reward their supporters and punish their opponents, who 
included Runfola.1 
The Director dismissed the charge as untimely filed. He held that the time to file 
this charge ran from the date in early July 1998 when, to Runfola's knowledge, the 
collective bargaining agreement was amended. According to the.Director, July 1998 
was the date the alleged violation occurred and the date at which Runfola was injured. 
As the charge was filed on January 28, 1999, more than six months after that July date, 
dismissal was required by §204.1 (a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure that allows only a 
four-month period for filing improper practice charges. 
Runfola argues in his exceptions that the Director's decision is contrary to CPLR 
217(2) which allows a DFR proceeding to be commenced against a union or an 
employer within 
four months of the date the employee or former employee knew or 
should have known that the breach has occurred, or within four 
months of the date the employee or former employee suffers actual 
harm, whichever is later. 
Runfola argues that he did not suffer actual harm until the Authority applied the 
collective bargaining agreement to him. The Director's decision, according to Runfola, 
1The Authority is not alleged to have violated the Act. Although Runfola 
completed that portion of the charge form pertaining to employers which are deemed 
parties to certain types of DFR charges under §209-a.3 of the Act, the Authority is not a 
party pursuant to that section of the Act. Under §209-a.3 of the Act, employers not 
named as respondents are automatically made parties only to DFR charges involving 
alleged violations of the collective bargaining agreement. Runfola's charge is not 
grounded upon the Local's failure or refusal to process a claim that the Authority 
violated its contract with the Local. Indeed, it is the Authority's compliance with the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement which allegedly harmed Runfola. 
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uses unrelated timeliness principles to obliterate CPLR 217(2) and the policies 
underlying that statute to effect a result contrary to the policies of the Act. Neither the 
Local nor the Authority has responded to the exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the arguments, we affirm the 
Director's decision 
To begin, we must correct a mistaken assumption which underlies Runfola's 
argument. The CPLR is not, as Runfola assumes, directly applicable to improper 
practice charges. The CPLR is applicable only to civil judicial proceedings.2 Improper 
practice charges are administrative proceedings under which a charging party notifies 
the agency of its belief that an unlawful act has occurred. Therefore, the statute of 
limitations provisions in CPLR 217(2) are not applicable perse to the filing of improper 
practice charges with this agency. Neither, however, for reasons next explained, are 
those statutory provisions irrelevant in our consideration of the timeliness of improper 
practice charges. 
The cited CPLR provision was part of broader legislation in 19903 dealing 
generally with PERB's role in the adjudication, disposition and remedy of DFR improper 
practice charges. That legislation codified DFR caselaw by explicitly recognizing a DFR 
breach as an improper practice,4 required the joinder of employers in certain types of 
2CPLR101. 
31990N.Y. Laws ch. 467. 
4Act §209-a.2(c). DFR charges were previously, and still are, properly 
processed under §209-a.2(a) of the Act which makes a union's interference with an 
employee's rights an improper practice. 
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DFR cases5 and expanded PERB's remedial powers in cases in which a DFR breach 
was found to have occurred.6 
The amendments to CPLR 217 respecting the statute of limitations for DFR 
claims were made in response to the Court of Appeals' decision in Baker v. Board of 
Education of the West Irondequoit School District (hereafter Baker).7 In Baker, the 
Court held that the six-year limitations period in CPLR 213 had to apply to DFR judicial 
proceedings because no other limitations period had been prescribed by the 
Legislature. In reaching this result, however, the Court recommended that a shorter 
limitations period be provided. 
The four-month statute of limitations in CPLR 217 is the same as the period 
allowed for the filing of improper practice charges. It is clear from the history of the 
1990 legislation that the Legislature wanted the same timeliness rules to apply whether 
a person elected to bring a DFR claim to court by commencing a civil action or 
proceeding or by filing an improper practice charge.8 The Legislature was persuaded 
by 1990 that an individual's choice of the forum in which to present a DFR claim should 
not affect the disposition of that claim. 
5Act §209-a.3. See note 1. 
6Act §205.5(d). 
770 N.Y.2d 314, 20 PERB 1J7512 (1987). 
8Aithough a DFR breach is an improper practice, something ordinarily within our 
exclusive jurisdiction under §205.5(d) of the Act, DFR claims in the public sector, like 
those in the private sector, have long been treated as ones within the concurrent 
jurisdiction of PERB and the courts. The amendments to CPLR 217 confirm that 
concurrent jurisdiction. 
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We conclude, therefore, that the amendments to CPLR 217(2) in 1990 were 
intended by the Legislature to be a codification of our timeliness principles for 
application in civil judicial proceedings and our administrative proceedings. This 
conclusion, in turn, necessitates a further one regarding the meaning of the phrase 
"suffers actual harm" because that phrase applies, albeit indirectly, to our administrative 
proceedings. 
Runfola alleges that he was not actually harmed until the Authority applied the 
contract provision to him in October 1998 and caused him to lose a position he alleges 
he would have retained under the provisions of the prior agreement. This interpretation 
is incorrect both in the context of this particular case and in general. 
This charge is not about the Authority's application of the contract clause to 
Runfola. This charge is about the Local's negotiation of that clause, allegedly as a way 
for the Local to reward its friends and punish its enemies. Runfola knew in July 1998 
that the clause had been negotiated for reasons known to him and which he believes to 
be improper. July 1998, when the contract was amended, was the date the DFR 
breach occurred and actually harmed Runfola, along with all other unit employees. 
According to Runfola's own allegations, layoffs were common for persons in his 
position.. He had to have known that he would be laid off in the future, as he had been 
in the past, and that when he was, the provisions of the collective bargaining 
agreement as amended in July 1998 would be applied to him if they were then still in 
effect. The Authority's actions in October 1998 were merely the ministerial 
implementation of a contract negotiated by the Local to Runfola's actual detriment in 
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July 1998. The Authority's adherence to that clause in October 1998 was an entirely 
separate event by a party not named in the charge or otherwise a party to the charge. 
An act by the Authority cannot mark the date for the filing of a charge against the Local. 
Apart from the factual context in which this particular charge arises, Runfola's 
interpretation of "actual harm" is inconsistent with our general timeliness principles, 
which are embodied in CPLR 217(2). 
In relevant context, a DFR breach and the actual harm resulting therefrom can, 
and often will, coincide, just as improper practice violation/harm often occurs 
simultaneously in other types of improper practices. Therefore, although City of 
Oswego (hereafter Oswego),9 relied upon by the Director, is not a DFR case, its 
timeliness principles are applicable to all classes of improper practice charges, 
including DFR cases. 
In Oswego, the City allegedly changed unilaterally the procedures to be used if 
an employee claimed certain statutory benefits. The union's representatives had been 
told that the new procedures had been adopted and that those procedures would be 
the ones the City was "going to start using". Within four months of the first unit 
employee being adversely affected by the City's application of the new procedures, the 
union filed an improper practice charge. That charge was dismissed as untimely filed, 
the Board holding that the announcement of the change in procedures coincided with 
the date of first injury or harm. 
'23 PERB Tf3007 (1990). Accord City of Binghamton, 31 PERB ff3088 (1998). 
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In the context of this DFR case, the Local's negotiation of the contract clause 
was both its announcement to the unit employees of the new layoff procedures and the 
date all unit employees, including Runfola, were injured and first suffered harm as a 
result of the negotiation of that clause. Again, it bears emphasis that the Authority's 
application of that clause to Runfola in October 1998 is not before us because the 
Authority is not a party to this charge. As stated previously, an act by a nonparty 
cannot be used as the act by which the timeliness of a charge against a different party 
is measured. 
To accept Runfola's arguments would mean that there could be a new DFR 
charge every time any unit employee was adversely affected by the application of a 
contract clause to that employee no matter when that contract clause had been 
negotiated. The single act of negotiating a contract term cannot produce multiple 
alleged violations of the Act, litigable years after the negotiations have concluded, if the 
policies of the Act favoring stability in labor relations and the need for finality are to be 
given effect.10 
Runfola knew more than four months before this charge was filed that the Local 
had negotiated a new layoff clause, knew what he alleges to have been the Local's 
officers' motivation, and knew or should have known that the clause would be applied 
to him the next time after July 1998 he was laid off from work. As of July 1998, 
10See Westchester County Correction Officers' Benevolent Ass'n, 30 PERB 
P075(1997). 
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therefore, there was an arguable DFR breach, actual notice of that breach, and 
resulting harm. The charge filed more than six months after the operative date in July 
1998 is time barred and the charge was correctly dismissed by the Director for that 
reason. 
For the reasons set forth above, the charge must be, and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: May 24, 1999 
Albany, New York 
\ 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JEFFREY BRIDGE, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4849 
VILLAGE OF ANDOVER, 
Employer, 
-and-
TEAMSTERS UNION LOCAL 317, 
Intervenor. 
JEFFREY BRIDGE, pro se 
HARTER, SECREST & EMERY, LLP (DAVID KRESOCK of counsel), for 
Employer 
JAMES AUGST, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
On December 14, 1998, Jeffrey Bridge (petitioner) filed a timely petition for 
decertification of the Teamsters Union Local 317 (intervenor), the current negotiating 
representative for employees in the following unit: 
Included: All employees in a unit represented by Teamsters Union Local 317 
and in the employ of the Village in the Department of Public Works. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Case No. C-4849 page 2 
Upon consent of the parties, a mail ballot election was held on April 20, 1999. 
The results of this election show that the majority of eligible employees in the unit who 
cast valid ballots no longer desire to be represented for purposes of collective 
negotiations by the intervenor.-
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the intervenor be, and it hereby is, 
decertified as the negotiating agent for the unit. 
DATED: May 24, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michaet'R. Cuevas, Chairman 
arc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
Of the two ballots cast, one was for representation and one against 
representation. There were no challenged ballots. 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JANET CICARELLI and JOYCE REICH, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-4852 
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON, 
Employer, 
- and -
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
JANET CICARELLI, for Petitioners 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (MARILYN S. DYMOND of 
counsel), for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by petitioners Janet Cicarelli and 
Joyce Reich (petitioners) to a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices 
and Representation (Director). Petitioners are employed by the County of Washington 
(County) and are included in a negotiating unit for which the County recognized the 
Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) as 
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the bargaining agent on December 1, 1998. The petitioners' petition was filed on 
December 16, 1998 and it seeks to decertify1 CSEA. 
The Director dismissed the petition as untimely filed. Interpreting §201.3(c) of 
our Rules, the Director held that only an employee organization denied recognition may 
file a petition to challenge the employer's recognition of a different union. 
The petitioners argue in their exceptions that the Director's interpretation of our 
Rules was incorrect and too restrictive. They claim that we have discretion to allow this 
petition to be processed and ask us to investigate the County's recognition of CSEA 
and to order an election pursuant to their petition. 
CSEA has moved to dismiss the exceptions because they were not served as 
required by §201.12(a) of our Rules. On the merits, CSEA argues that the Director's 
decision dismissing the petition is correct. The County has not responded. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' arguments, we dismiss 
and deny the exceptions on procedural and substantive grounds. 
Section 201.12(a) of our Rules requires a party filing exceptions to serve those 
exceptions on all other parties and to file proof of such service with us. Petitioners have 
not done either. As service is a component of a timely filing, we have dismissed 
1A "decertification" petition is used to challenge the majority status of either a 
recognized or a certified union. Rules of Procedure §201.2(a) (Rules). 
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exceptions upon motion by a party which has not been served.2 Not having been 
served, these exceptions must be dismissed pursuant to CSEA's motion. 
We have not previously had, however, the occasion to discuss the meaning of 
§201.3(c) of our Rules. The novelty of that issue and its importance to the 
administration of our Rules warrant our consideration of the merits of these exceptions 
notwithstanding these pro se petitioners' failure to serve the exceptions. 
Our Rules, reflecting the applicable provisions of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act),3 establish the times at which and the circumstances under which 
representation petitions may be filed. 
The only rule arguably applicable to this petition is §201.3(c) that provides as 
follows: 
A petition for certification or decertification may be filed within 30 
days after publication of notice as described in §201.6 of this part, 
or receipt of written notice, that another employee organization has 
been recognized. Such a petition shall be supported by a showing 
of interest of at least 30 percent of the employees in the unit 
deemed appropriate by the employer or alleged to be appropriate 
by the petitioner. 
The Director held that the reference in §201.3(c) of the Rules to "another 
employee organization" made it clear that the rule was not intended to allow employees 
to file a petition challenging a recognition granted a union by their employer. Rather, 
2City of Watervliet, 30 PERB P024 (1997); Catskill Reg. Off-Track Betting Corp., 
14 PERB |f3075 (1981) (subsequent history omitted). 
3Act §208.2. 
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§201.3(c) of the Rules, according to the Director, was intended to allow a union, which 
had had its demand for recognition refused by the employer's voluntary recognition of 
another union, to petition for its certification and the simultaneous decertification of the 
recognized union. 
We agree with the Director's interpretation of the rule. In addition to the plain 
language of §201.3(c) of the Rules, the Director's interpretation is supported by the 
history of that rule and its placement within the context of the several other rules 
pertaining to the times representation petitions may be filed. 
Current §201.3(c) of the Rules derived from a rule promulgated in 1967. The 
1967 form of the rule allowed a petition to be filed within 30 days after publication of 
notice that "an" employee organization had been recognized. In 1969, that rule was 
amended to read, as it does now, that petitions may be filed within 30 days of 
publication or receipt of notice that "another" employee organization had been 
recognized. 
The change from "an" to "another" to modify "employee organization" clearly 
evidences our intention to permit only unions which had been denied recognition to 
challenge the status of the union actually recognized by an employer. The word 
"another" means a different one of the same kind or category.4 The use of the phrase 
"another employee organization" in Rules §201.3(c) can refer only to petitions filed by 
one or more unions refused recognition because a different union was recognized. To 
4Webster's New Universal Unabridged Dictionary (1996). 
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construe the rule so as to permit employees to file petitions seeking to challenge their 
employer's recognition of a union would make the use of the word "another" in the 
quoted phrase meaningless. 
This interpretation is further supported when §201.3(c) is considered in the 
-•••- context of the other paragraphs within that section. Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of 
§201.3(c) of the Rules all deal with petition filings arising in the context of an employer's 
actions following a demand by one or more unions for recognition from the employer. 
Under §201.3(a), petitions may be filed after a lapse of time if a demand for recognition 
has not been refused. Under §201.3(b), petitions may be filed within a fixed period of 
time if a union's demand for recognition has been refused other than by the employer's 
recognition of a different union. Section 201.3(c) allows petitions to be filed within a 
fixed time by one or more unions which were seeking, but which were refused, 
recognition because another union was recognized instead. 
Together, §201.3(a), (b) and (c) of the Rules are intended to deal with the range 
of circumstances presented by demands by one or more unions for recognition and the 
petition options afforded to unions and employers, paragraphs (b) and (c) dealing 
specifically with different ways a demand for recognition can be refused. As the 
Director correctly observed, petitions for decertification filed by unit employees are the 
subject of §201.3(d) and (e) of the Rules. The first three paragraphs of §201.3 of the 
Rules are simply not intended to cover petitions filed by employees who disfavor their 
employer's voluntary grant of recognition to a union. 
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For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are dismissed and denied and 
the Director's decision dismissing the petition is affirmed. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 24, 1999 
Albany, New York 
R. Cuevas, Chairman 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4783 
TOWN OF GALEN, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit found to be appropriate 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-4783 page 2 
Included: Motor equipment operator, laborer, and deputy superintendent. 
Excluded: Highway superintendent and all other employees. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to 
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating 
any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 24, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
v Marc A. Abbott, Member 
John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 
AND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4800 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS UNION, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding- having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
-The petition sought to decertify the intervenor. 
Certification - C-4800 page 2 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State Correctional Officers and 
Police Benevolent Association, Inc. has been designated and selected by a majority of 
the employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the 
parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances: 
Included: Security Services Unit. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the New York State Correctional Officers and Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal 
or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: May 24, 1999 
Albany, New York — . 
Michae^ R. Cuevas, Chairman 
—jf i " — » * — T : — 
Marc A. Abbott, Member 
/John T. Mitchell, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE CORRECTIONAL OFFICERS 
AND POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-4810 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
-and-
NEW YORK STATE LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS UNION, DISTRICT COUNCIL 82, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding- having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the New York State Law Enforcement Officers 
-The petition sought to decertify the intervenor. 
Certification - C-4810 page 2 
Union, District Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above named public employer, in the unit agreed upon 
by the parties and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances: 
Included: Security Supervisors Unit. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the New York State Law Enforcement Officers Union, District 
Council 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual 
obligation to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written 
agreement incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. Such 
obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of 
a concession. 
DATED: May 24, 1999 
Albany, New York 
Michael R. Cuevas, Chairman 
.... IAA /YJM. 
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/Jorin T. Mitchell, Member 
